Modelling of Hazards Effect on Safety Integrity of Open Transmission Systems by Rástočný, Karol et al.
Computing and Informatics, Vol. 35, 2016, 470–496
MODELLING OF HAZARDS EFFECT ON SAFETY
INTEGRITY OF OPEN TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS
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Abstract. The paper is concerned with safety appraisal of safety-related com-
munication systems (SRComSs) with open transmission system, where except in
addition to message transmission integrity also confidentiality is recommended to
be provided. The authors focused on safety analysis of safety-related messages
transmission secured using cryptographic and safety code mechanisms and on the
possibilities of modelling safety-related industrial communication system, where
a high safety integrity level SIL3 is required to be guaranteed. The paper features
mathematical procedures to calculate the rate of hazardous transmission failure of
safety-related messages in the result of electromagnetic interference (EMI) effects
in the communication channel and by the presence of random hardware failures of
SRComS. The theoretical techniques and safety analyses emerge from risk analysis
and are compared with the knowledge gained by the authors during safety verifi-
cations of such systems for transportation applications. It is a little explored area,
because the standards concerning safety-related control systems (SRCSs) did not
support any cryptography-based methods. A quantitative safety integrity analysis
Modelling of Hazards Effect on Safety Integrity of Open Transmission Systems 471
of SRComS is based on utilisation of Markov’s processes. The proposed Markov’s
model is applied on an open transmission system built on the IEEE 802.11g stan-
dard, which is complemented by cryptographic and safety code. The calculations
are performed using Mathematica software tool. The proposed base model is uni-
versal and can be modified (simplified) in dependence on the parameters of a specific
SRComS.
Keywords: Safety-related communication system, open transmission system, in-
dustrial application, safety integrity level, encryption code, safety code, safety as-
sessment, modelling, Markov model
1 INTRODUCTION
The problem related with the evaluation of safety-related communication (SRCom)
for closed transmission systems is for several decades in focus of scientific teams of
experts working in the area of SRCS and its components (sensors, actuators, . . . ),
which typically use industrial buses (fieldbus) or some of the industrial Ethernet
standards [1, 2, 3] for internal and external data transmission. Nowadays, for the
industrial applications using closed transmission systems with SIL3 safety integrity
level, “safety profiles” are certified for several families of CPF (Communication
Profile Family), for example CIP Safety (CPF 2), ProfiSafe (CPF 3), openSafety
(CPF 13), Foundation FieldBUS Safety (CPF 1), Interbus Safety (CPF 6). Manu-
facturers and users of these safety products from the field of industrial automation
form associations, like Profibus and ProfiNet International [4], Open Device Vendor
Associations (ODVA) [5], Ethernet Powerlink Standardisation Group (EPSG) [6].
The efforts for flexibility and cost reduction caused that the oncoming develop-
ment of “safety profiles” heads to higher versions accepting also utilisation of open
transmission systems for SRComS. More often, it is possible to practically encounter
a SRComS utilising Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) technologies, so called “se-
curity” principles from standard transmission systems, to support the “safety”. For
instance, producers of Profibus/ProfiNet technology developed a Scalance S security
solution for the ProfiNet network based on VPN (Virtual Private Network) with the
use of IPsec protocol tunnelling mode which uses cryptographic mechanisms [7].
We can say that the world of industrial communication, which was recently util-
ising proprietary solutions and generally did not support any cryptography-based
methods, gradually proceeds to open solutions and is trying to catch up the ICT (In-
formation and Communication Technology) world, even in the field of cryptography
and the overall improvement of applications security management. The require-
ment to implement cryptographic mechanisms in industry emerged primarily from
the growth of wireless technologies utilisation for the communication with remote
workplaces via public networks [8]. Today it is obvious, that wireless communication
systems have a great potential in the process control (not only in industry, but also
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in other areas like transportation), as evidenced by (besides already exerted Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, ZigBee and other standards) the deployment of relatively new standards
focusing on the process automation, specifically Wireless HART, WIA-PA and ISA
100.11a [9].
A standard SRCS can be generally decomposed to several basic components
(blocks). One of these components is SRComS which can by its characteristics
significantly influence the quality of safety functions performed by SRCS. Seeing that
SRComS is just one of the components participating in the provisioning of safety
function, it has to show a considerably lower probability of hazardous failure than the
tolerable failure probability of safety function in activity in question. For example,
in case the safety function has to be performed with SIL3, according to [10] the
average frequency of dangerous failure of the safety function is 10−8 ≤ up to < 10−7
per hour for a high demand mode. Demonstration of appropriate safety properties
of SRComS is a precondition for its practical utilisation.
In order to set a methodics for safety assessment of open communication systems
with the cryptographic coder/decoder mechanism, it is necessary to go out from the
definition of open communication system, from the analysis of attacks on messages
during transmission through this system and from the current state of existing com-
putationally secure security mechanisms from the cryptography field. Probably the
most sophisticated specification of safety requirements on the communication be-
tween safety-related applications is stated in [11]. This specification is based on
analysis of possible hazards and measures handling these hazards. The information
part of standard [11] also introduces general recommendations on how to proceed
when evaluating safety integrity of SRComS. However, these recommendations are
primarily related to a closed SRComS, utilisation of which in railway applications
has a long-term tradition. Many other standards related to industrial applications
(for example [12]) are based on recommendations listed in [11]. According to [11],
an open communication system can consist of an unknown number of users working
on one hand with non-safety-related devices and on the other hand with safety-
related equipment (SREs). When designing a communication system it is supposed,
that the users are unknown and the transmission system transmits an unknown
amount of data in an unknown format. The transmission media and its character-
istics are unknown to users and the transmission system is routing and directing
messages via routes from a single or several types of transmission media. In order
to provide transmission of safety-related messages, an open communication system
has to dispose of transmission functions that guarantee authenticity, integrity and
recency of messages at the receiving end with the use of cryptography techniques.
2 PAPER CONTRIBUTIONS
The content of this paper is linked to the problem solved by the authors in [13]
which was related to the assessment of safety integrity of a closed SRComS. The
paper also builds on the results of mathematical modelling of cryptographic error
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code probability for encrypted transmission of safety-related messages [14, 15] of
variant length, which is disturbed by EMI and secured using a safety code.
The authors modified the method for assessment of SRComS safety integrity
(published in [13]) so it respects the effect of random hardware failures of the evalu-
ated SRComS and also considers attacks caused by an unauthorised person. These
considerations focused on the choice of cryptographic code parameters in compliance
with recommendations [11], with the goal to maintain computational and equivalent
security of the chosen mechanisms in regard to cryptography utilisation specifics in
a high safety integrity level applications.
The design of a generally valid method of quantitative assessment of safety in-
tegrity of an open SRComS can be considered genuine. It includes wireless technolo-
gies which are currently preferred in the industry for transmission of SR messages
with the highest threat level (according to [11] transmission system category 3),
where the masking thread type cannot be excluded.
The proposed state model has been applied to specific industrial SRComS util-
ising Wi-Fi IEEE 802.11g based transmission.
The main contribution of this paper is in the design of a quantitative method for
evaluation of safety integrity of an open SRComS with open untrusted transmission
system, where the core security mechanism is a cryptographic code. Achievement
of this primary objective is connected with the following particular tasks:
• Analysis of hazards and its effects on safety integrity of the considered SRComS
with a focus on wireless technologies standards recommended for use in industrial
automation.
• Quantitative evaluation of risk factor parameters.
• Proposal of protection measures for elimination of risk factors with the focus on
provisioning of integrity and confidentiality of SR messages transmission.
• Mathematical procedures for expression of the cryptographic decoder error prob-
ability (with the focus on modern computationally-secure symmetric block ci-
phers) in dependence on SR message length, cipher block size, in combination
with the method of securing the transmitted messages using a safety code.
• Design of a base state model and its modification for the specific SRComS sam-
ple, assessment of its transitions between states with the goal to calculate the
failure rate of its safety function.
The paper is not dedicated to methods and procedures providing a key for a sym-
metric cipher cryptographic code in SREs. It is supposed that the KMS (Key Man-
agement Systems) procedures from generation, distribution, archiving and alteration
of keys is provided by a secure way in compliance with the recommendations [11].
The results of this analysis are applicable on a multipoint connection, because
ultimately the preferred input methods in real-time (RT) communication enable
transmission of SR messages of high priority between two nodes (for example a cyclic
transmission in a master-slave mode).
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3 APPROACHES PROMOTED WITHIN THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF CRYPTOGRAPHY IN INDUSTRIAL SRCOMS
When utilising SRComS the transmitted and stored data have to be protected us-
ing cryptographic mechanisms, in case an intentional attack cannot be excluded.
Regarding the required SIL of safety function utilising SRCom, a detailed safety
analysis of transmission system and the utilised cryptographic protection has to be
performed and prove the adequacy of:
• Technical choice of cryptographic techniques – related to selected encryption
algorithm (e.g. symmetric or asymmetric), key characteristics (e.g. fixed or gen-
erated during connection – session keys), reasonability of selected key-length,
frequency of key renewal, and physical key storage.
• Technical option of cryptographic architectures – related to the revision of cor-
rect functionality of chosen cryptographic mechanisms and cryptographic pro-
cesses when implemented outside SRE.
• Cryptographic keys management activities – this part of safety analysis is related
to generation, storage, distribution and cancellation of confidential keys, device
management, revision process for the adequacy of cryptographic techniques in
relation to risks emerging from malicious attacks.
In principle, approaches for application of cryptography within the communica-
tion between SREs can be divided into two solutions (see Figures 1 a), b)):
• Cryptographic technique is a part of security protections of an individual SRE
(Assurance of unauthorised access layer in Figure 1 a)).
• Cryptographic technique is a part of security protections of several SREs com-
municating within an internal industrial network and is implemented into a sep-
arated assurance of unauthorised access layer (see Figure 1 b)). For instance, it
is recommended to use firewall, though it has to be incorporated into the security
policy of safety-related application. A firewall also utilises cryptographic mecha-
nisms to perform security requirements. In addition to access protection, it can
also provide other security services (for example confidentiality). Its primary
task is to block unauthorised network traffic between an internal (protected)
and external network for example by not allowing a direct connection between
a node in the internet and a node in the industrial network. A firewall can
be configured in a way allowing communication via specific protocols only, for
example ProfiNet.
During the safety analysis of SRComS in the practical part of the paper, the
authors came out from the approach described in Figure 1 a). As illustrated in
Figure 1 a) and Figure 1 b), besides the assurance of unauthorised access layer, the
assurance of data transmission level is always a part of SRE, which incorporates
safety protections eliminating the effects of EMI in the transmission system. The
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transmission system is often referred to as “black channel”, because its behaviour is
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Figure 1. Approaches enforced when implementing cryptography in industrial SRComS
SRComS for industrial applications is in several cases composed of a certain num-
ber of nodes requiring real-time communication. Safety-related applications require
a choice of cryptographic mechanisms parameters providing the highest possible
safety integrity level, which considerably impacts time demandingness of operations
and ultimately can cause a loss of real-time operation ability.
In case a SRComS utilises cryptography, following specifics have to be considered
in addition to COTS technology:
• Limited computing performance of devices – in some applications (e.g. 8-bit
architecture), the use of modern (primarily asymmetric) cryptography principles
can be problematic, because it involves complex mathematical operations from
theory of numbers and modular arithmetic.
• The required response during data transmission over the network in real-time
(response speed) – performance of cryptographic operation has to be realised in
real-time in order to meet the required response time.
• Effective cryptographic keys management – besides implementation of crypto-
graphic algorithms, the key management has also to be performed in real-time
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(a key is the biggest weakness of cryptographic protocols), cryptographic solu-
tions are incomplete without key management. A key stored in a device is very
vulnerable. It has to be frequently modified, the best way is to generate a new
one for each new communication.
The most recommended cryptographic techniques for SRComS are encryption
techniques and digital signature techniques. The following section of this section
briefly introduces an overview of algorithms and operational modes recommended
for the safety-related industrial applications area.
3.1 Encryption Techniques and Its Specifics
The encryption mechanisms in production enterprises are utilised for example for the
concealment of production formulas, procedures and the overall enterprise “know-
how”. When using encryption on the technological control level in safety-related
applications, in order to accelerate calculations, specialised modules are being used –
security integrated circuits with high-speed processor [16], which performs encryp-
tion and key management separately, thereby relieving the application. In case of
an unauthorised keys manipulation or unauthorised module intrusion detection, the
keys are automatically destroyed.
Verified block cipher standards are recommended for SRComS; the use of stream
ciphers is not recommended, due to a much lower security. From the block ciphers
set, cryptographic measures utilising a single key can be preferred. These are sym-
metric encryption systems having several advantages for the use in industrial appli-
cations – they enable high-speed data encryption, utilise relatively short keylengths,
are based on a more simple mathematical principles (substitutions, permutations)
and besides safety integrity, they also provide confidentiality and data source au-
thorisation (the communicating entities share a secret key on which they agreed or
obtained in a secure way). In addition, the safety integrity can be improved by
combining with a suitable operational mode. Safety-related applications are not
recommended to utilise the ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode, but in order to im-
prove safety integrity the CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode is enforced, exerting
a feed-back mechanism before encryption and decryption, thereby eliminating some
types of attacks, e.g. block replay [17]. Currently, computationally secure symmetric
cipher algorithms are considered to be some modifications of DES (Data Encryption
Standard) algorithm, primarily the 3-DES with three keys, for which (also in re-
spect on existing cryptanalytic attacks) the effective keylength is 112 bits. A more
enforced cryptographic standard is AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) [18] in
AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 versions, currently applied in all communication
areas or data storage, programming languages and platforms, and is considered to
be a computationally secure cipher.
In case the computational performance of a safety-related application allows it,
for the encryption of small data volumes cryptographic measures with a key pair can
be implemented. These are asymmetric cryptographic systems eliminating the prob-
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lem of secure channel needed for key transmission (in contrast to symmetric encryp-
tion systems) and based on operational conditions, the key pair can be utilised with-
out modification for a longer period. Nowadays, the RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman)
algorithms are considered to be computationally secure and mostly used. Accord-
ing to preliminary estimations, a secure length of RSA parameters (the module N
as a product of two prime numbers) exceeds the boundary of module N > 2 000
(corresponding to a 300 or 600-digit number, respectively). This implies the rec-
ommendation not to utilise RSA with the length of N lower than 2 048 bits, and
for a long-term use an implementation with the length of 8 192 bits is in prepara-
tion. The opinions of experts on the increase of cryptographic module N size vary,
some cryptologists in the field of asymmetric cryptography recommend to switch as
soon as possible to ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography), a new perspective trend in
modern asymmetric cryptography [19].
The security of cryptographic algorithms can be expressed using equivalent se-
curity, which indicates a relation between keylength (in bits) in correlation with
currently known cryptanalytic attacks on the algorithm [20].
3.2 Digital Signature Techniques and Its Specifics
Digital signature mechanisms are reasonable in safety-related applications where
credibility of information incoming from (or outgoing to) remote nodes has to be
verified. Other application areas are for example verification of a software update
before its deployment, verification of hardware configuration changes and other.
Currently the most recognised digital signature schemes using asymmetric cryp-
tography are the following:
• RSA digital signature scheme – security is based on the difficulty of large num-
bers factorisation (size of module N).
• DSA digital signature scheme (with modified El Gamal algorithm) – security is
based on the complexity of discrete logarithms calculation.
• ECDSA digital signature scheme with elliptic curves algorithm – security is
based on the complexity of discrete logarithms calculation referred to as ECDLP
(Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem) [21].
In addition, all digital signature schemes are based on the security of the em-
ployed hash function [22].
4 MODELLING OF HAZARDS EFFECT ON SAFETY INTEGRITY
OF SAFETY-RELATED COMMUNICATION SYSTEM (SRCOMS)
WITH CRYPTOGRAPHY CODE
Let there be a SRComS with the open transmission system enabling transmission
of safety-related messages between two nodes (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. SRComS with cryptographic and safety codes
The SRComS under consideration (Figure 2) consists of two safety-related equip-
ment SRE1 and SRE2 and an open untrusted transmission system. In order to
provide trustworthiness of message transmission with a guaranteed safety integrity
level, the transmission system has to incorporate proper transmission functions
and has to prevent unauthorised access to a safety-related message. For a defined
safety-related application (SR-APL), these functions are physically performed us-
ing a pair – encryption coder/decoder (EC/ED) and safety coder/decoder (SC/SD)
and are a part of SRE. The mentioned safety functions are an extension of trans-
mission coder/decoder (TC/TD) of the untrusted transmission system. A part
of the untrusted transmission system is an open communication channel (OCC),
which is affected by the electromagnetic interference and by attacks conducted by
an unauthorised individual, which cannot be excluded in case of an open trans-
mission system [14]. The safety analysis of SRComS presented in this paper is
based on the assumption, that the message is bit-oriented and the communication
channel can be modelled as a BSC (Binary Symmetric Channel). The function
of cryptographic coder is to encrypt the message into an incomprehensible form,
i.e. to ensure its confidentiality. As already mentioned before, SRComS are recom-
mended to use a cryptographic code [11] operating with a secret key, therefore the
safety analysis is realised for the EC/ED pair working with a cryptographic code
from the block ciphers set. The probabilities of encrypted message error are influ-
enced by the type of interference in the communication channel (bit error rate of
a single element – bit in BSC) and its residual error rate in a great measure de-
pends on the matter of securing using a chosen safety code. The introduced facts
imply that during quantitative evaluation of cryptographic decoder error caused
by EMI, the SC/SD pair cannot be omitted. From this perspective, the secu-
rity extension in a form of EC/ED and SC/SD in SRE has to be understood as
a combined coding system which algorithm operates with two block codes, with
the difference that the EC/ED pair needs a variable element for its operation –
a key.
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4.1 Main Factors Affecting SRComS Safety
During transmission of a message its corruption has to be considered. Message
corruption is an undesirable event, which can ultimately lead to a dangerous failure
of safety function, on which the SRComS participates. The events which can cause
message corruption can be categorised into:
• intentional – caused by a targeted activity of a person with the aim to gather,
modify, insert or remove transmitted information
• unintentional – caused by a transmission system failure or its improper operation
and maintenance or caused by the effects of the operational environment.
The main hazard in a safety-related communication is considered to be a situa-
tion, when a message generated by the application part of SRE1 is modified during
its transmission through the transmission system in such a way, that it alters its
information content and the application part of SRE2 considers it correct (not cor-
rupted).
4.1.1 Attacks Caused by an Intentional Activity
of Unauthorised Individual
The attacks by an unauthorised person cannot be evaluated quantitatively. The
effect of these attacks on the safety of transmitted messages has to be considered
within the risk analysis and based on this analysis to choose a suitable computa-
tionally secure cryptographic mechanism, in accordance with the development of
modern cryptographic means.
4.1.2 Failures Caused by the Effect of the Operational Environment
and Elimination Options
Seeing that safety-related messages are transmitted via a real communication chan-
nel, it is necessary to consider the influence of noise or interferences on the transmit-
ted messages, which significantly affects the frequency of corrupted messages. The
electromagnetic interference is a result of a number of various effects (noises, re-
flections, fading effect), which cannot be described in a deterministic way, therefore
the models of communication channels are also based on probability characteristics.
The standard [11] recommends for the safety analysis of communication based on
binary transmission to use the binary symmetric channel model without memory for
the bit error rate of the communication channel pb within the interval 0 to 0.5. This
model supposes that the errors during binary message transmission are random and
mutually independent. In case a BSC model is considered at the transmission of
binary messages with an error rate of one bit (element) pb, then the probability, that
a message of length m bits contains exactly i errors, is given by the relation [23]
pi = (pb)
i.(1− pb)m−i. (1)
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If the bit error rate of BSC is over 0.5, it is probable, that the receiver (SRE2)
inverts binary values, i.e. interprets 0 as 1 and 1 as 0. In this case there are no
practically usable models available, therefore [11] recommends not to consider a value
pb > 0.5 within safety analyses.
A safety code with a high detection coverage and fast detection algorithm has
fundamental significance for safety-related applications. The requirements on the
choice of safety code parameters depend on the required safety properties of SR-
ComS (mainly on the tolerable probability or error intensity of corrupted mes-
sages).
In order to choose a safety code, practical problems related to proper code
parameters have to be solved [24]. These have to be considered, primarily:
• Code length. Typically, there is a requirement to be able to secure messages
of variable length with a single code, while most of theoretical knowledge on
codes is constrained on certain recommended construction code lengths, which
is practically mostly not met (shortened or extended codes are used). It is
necessary to keep in mind that a code of different length has different safety
properties.
• Code redundancy. A dominating opinion is that the more redundant bits are
used, the higher the safety is. The requirement for a higher number of redundant
bits is not always legitimate (e.g. CRC-64 – ISO with 64 redundant bits has worse
safety properties than a well-chosen code with 32 redundant bits) [25].
• Minimal Hamming distance dmin. Minimal Hamming distance is coupled on the
requirement to detect or correct errors until a certain multiplicity. Most codes
detect and subsequently correct single (independent) errors and errors of i –
multiplicity (dependent errors – bursts), too.
• Detection of chosen error patterns. Some types of errors can occur more fre-
quently. Therefore it is required to detect them by the code (e.g. repeated
bursts of a certain length, all bits of the message have the significance of 1 or 0,
message negation). But in most cases we do not know the probability of the
error patterns occurrence.
We can suppose that the safety properties of the SRComS under consideration
will be in a great measure dependent on the properties of cryptographic block code
and safety block code. These codes are used in combination, thereby positively
affecting safety integrity of SRComS even in the case of variable length messages
and variable error rate in BSC model.
In case a channel linear block code is used as a safety code, then the probability
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where pb is the probability of error of a single bit, n is length of code word, dmin
is minimal Hamming distance of the code, Ai is the overall number of code words
with weight i and ‖x‖ means integer value of x.
A more detailed procedure recommended for safety analyses of block codes
within communication systems with only a safety code is introduced in [27, 28].
4.1.3 Estimation of EMI Caused Failures Rate
Let the safety-related messages of length m bits transmitted from SRE1 be divided
into blocks of length k bits (plain text blocks) before entering EC and let output
blocks of length k bits (encryption blocks) from EC. Most of the commercially utilised
block ciphers have the same plain text and encrypted text blocks. For instance the
3-DES block cipher has a block length of the processed plain text of 64 bits, the
commercial AES cipher has the block length of 128 bits. In the next processing in
the transmission chain according to Figure 2, r redundant bits are added to blocks of
length k in SC because of EMI influence detection. The SC outputs binary blocks of
length n. Let us assume that the TC/TD pair, which is not a part of safety-related
transmission system also operates with a block channel code. Each bit inputting the
communication channel represented by a BSC model is influenced by the pb error
rate. We can say that the encrypted message cw (cipher words) on the output of ED
is evaluated as corrupted when at least one block of this message has been evaluated
as corrupted using the detection codes techniques (mostly working in the receiving
part on the principle of syndrome techniques).
If we assume independence of corrupt blocks on the input of ED, then the
probability of whole message corruption pcw is dependent on communication channel
bit error rate pb and is defined as [29]
pcw = p (w/be) . [1− (1− pb)m] , (3)
where p (w/be) is the conditional probability of output unencrypted message w
(word) corruption, if there is a corrupted block on the input of cryptographic de-
coder. If p (w/be) = 1, then
pcw ≤ 1− (1− pb)m ≤ m.pb. (4)
According to [26], by repeating the analysis for a sufficient number of input
m-bit messages, we can conclude, that for k bits in a simple encrypted block the
average probability of its corruption on the output (if there is a corrupted block on
the input) is given by the relation
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Based on Relations (3) and (5) the average set probability of cryptographic




. [1− (1− pb)m] . (6)
In case a proper safety code with error detection is used to increase the safety
integrity of SRComS with probability of unencrypted message error pw, then the









where pw is probability of unencrypted message error and the ratio m/k is number
of blocks created in the message.
If
pb  2.(m− 1)−1, (8)








Let pUS be a probability of undetected error of safety code and pUT a probabil-
ity of undetected error of transmission code. Providing that both codes are inde-
pendent, the probability of corruption of input unencrypted code word (in block)
pw = pUS.pUT and the resulting average probability of encrypted message corruption






1− (1− pUS.pUT )m/k
]
. (10)
The message failure rate MFREMI on the output of SRComS, which integrity
has been impaired by EMI during transmission, can be expressed by the relation
MFREMI = pcw.fEMI , (11)
where fEMI is frequency of corrupted messages in time (mostly per 1 hour) because
of EMI.
Two message formats are typically supported in industrial safety-related appli-
cations – short format (e.g. 2 kB length) and long format (e.g. 256 kB length), which
are mostly secured using transmission and safety code based on the principle of CRC
(Cyclic Redundancy Check). In this paper, the values of pUT were calculated with
the assumption of CRC-16 cyclic code utilisation and pUS of CRC-32 cyclic code for
both message formats.
Table 1 shows values of pcw and MFREMI calculated using Relations (10)
and (11) for typical parameters of SRComSs with Wi-Fi transmission according
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to IEEE 802.11.g (physical transfer rate 54 Mb/s). From the perspective of trans-
mission mode we suppose cyclic message transmission with transmission acknowl-
edgement between master and the individual slave nodes in the network so that with
a two-point connection (master–slave) a transmission occurs once in 50 ms (72 000
messages per hour). The calculated values (Table 1) are not time-dependent, be-
cause extreme (often practically the most adverse) values of pUT , pUS are consid-
ered in regard to the time parameter. The most adverse scenario is supposed even
when determining the frequency of corrupt messages fEMI , i.e. it is expected that
all messages on the input of receiver of the transmission system are corrupted.
A message is considered to be corrupted in case when at least one message block is
corrupted.
Short format of SR message m = 2 kB Long format of SR message m = 256 kB
k [b] pcw [-] fEMI [h
−1] MFREMI [h
−1] pcw [–] fEMI [h
−1] MFREMI [h
−1]
64 0.888.10−12 72 000 6.394.10−8 113.686.10−12 72 000 8.185.10−6
128 0.444.10−12 72 000 3.197.10−8 56.843.10−12 72 000 4.092.10−6
Table 1. MFREMI in dependence on block size k
However, the Relation (11) does not respect the effect of other risk factors (un-
desirable events) on the safety of transmitted messages (for example the effect of
transmission system errors). Though, it is well suited for a “rapid” estimation of
correct choice of transmission and safety code in combination with the used crypto-
graphic code.
If a transmission system does not include channel transmission code coder/de-
coder, then pUT = 1.
4.1.4 Failures of the Individual SRComS Components





A source of systematic failures are primarily human errors caused during sys-
tem development (erroneous firmware), its implementation (faulty configuration) or
maintenance (improper servicing intervention). Systematic failures can be very ef-
fectively prevented by applying proper measures in all life-cycle stages of SRComS.
Quantitative assessment of systematic failures effects on SRComS safety integrity is
not performed, but it has to be proved that such measures were met, so that the
effect of systematic failures on safety integrity can be neglected.
Electronic components of SRComS are subject to random failures and failures
caused by aging. During the service life of SRComs it is not necessary to con-
sider failures caused by aging; only the incidence of random failures is assumed [10].
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Seeing that for electronic systems it is principally impossible to construct a list of
possible failures and analyse the effects of individual failures on the safety integrity
of SRComS (e.g. using FMEA (Fault Modes and Effects Analysis) [31]), the safety
analysis has to be based on probability principle and use the knowledge of random
failures rate and its distribution. A generally accepted statement says, that the
occurrence of random failures of electronic objects can be described by the exponen-
tial distribution law, hence the rate of random failures occurrence of these objects
is constant. Under these assumptions, the effect of failures on the safety integrity
of SRComS can be considered to be a homogenous Markov process with continuous
time.
Generally we can suppose, that not all object failures affect the safety integrity






where λOT is the total rate of random failures of an object, λ
O
H is the rate of random
failures of an object affecting the safety integrity of an object; λOS is the rate of
random failures of an object not affecting the safety integrity of an object. Because
it is very problematic to determine which part of random failures rate affects the
safety integrity of an object, a pessimistic assumption is mostly used during safety
analysis (primarily if a very high safety integrity is considered), that each failure of
object affects its safety integrity.
When designing SRComS components which are parts of SREs (SC, EC, SD,
ED), special techniques are being used to achieve the required SIL [18], assuring
that the rate of hazardous failures of these parts is significantly smaller than the
total rate of failures.
5 SRCOMS MODEL REALISATION
Figure 3 shows a state model of SRComS describing transition of SRComS from
state 1 (a state when the system is operational and the transmitted messages are
corrupted only by EMI influence) into a hazardous state 8 (message corruption has
not been detected and the message has been evaluated as correct by the receiver).
A transition from state 1 into state 8 can be realised as a result of:
• incidence of random failures of individual SRComS components
• insufficient detection properties of transmission code and safety code in combi-
nation with cryptographic code utilisation
• by EMI influence.
However, the introduced model does not respect the effects of systematic fail-
ures (e.g. software failures) nor the effect of attacks caused by an undesirable and
intentional activity of an unauthorised person.
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Figure 3. SRComS base model
The meaning of symbols used in Figure 3 is listed in Table 2.
The probability of achieving state 8 (or the rate of transition from state 1 into
state 8) depends, besides the stated risk factors, on the frequency of transmitted
messages and on the time between two functionality checks of SRComS (proof test
interval).
When determining the frequency of messages corrupted because of EMI during
a defined time unit (mostly 1 hour), we can consider a message transmission mode
preferred in industrial applications, which is cyclic message transmission. In case
the message is divided into blocks and each block is secured by a transmission and
safety code, then the model has to consider message blocks (Figure 4). From the
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Symbol Description
RTS Rate of random hardware failures of transmission system part (trans-
mitter, communication channel and receiver part)
RDT Rate of random hardware failures of transmission code decoder
RDS Rate of random hardware failures of safety code decoder
RDE Rate of random hardware failures of cryptographic code decoder
pUT Probability of error undetected by transmission code
pUS Probability of error undetected by safety code
pUE Probability of error undetected by encryption code
f Frequency of messages generated by transmitter
fEMI Frequency of messages on receiver input corrupted by EMI influence
fW Frequency of corrupted messages on receiver input without specifi-
cation of corruption cause
Table 2. Meaning of symbols in the model shown in Figure 3
safety perspective, a positive fact is that a message corruption is detected if leastwise
corruption of a single message block is detected.
However, many untrusted transmission systems implement a mechanism inspect-
ing the quality of transmission path of the communication channel and if the bit
error rate passes a threshold value, the transmission speed is decreased, thereby in-
creasing system’s availability, but can negatively affect the information delay time,
primarily in real-time process control. Generally, the positive effect of this mech-
anism is not considered in the safety analysis of SRCS, because often the most
adverse case is taken into account, i.e. the messages are transmitted at the highest
data transmission rate and all messages on the receiver’s input are corrupted.
A similar approach can be applied on the SRE2 side and suppose, that the re-
ceiver works in such a way, that all messages received are evaluated by the transmis-
sion code decoder as correct (e.g. as a result of its failure) and only safety properties
of the safety code decoder are followed or a strategy is used, when we primarily
rely on the transmission code and the safety code decoder performs a function of
a supervisor. After detecting the first corrupted message (a message which has been
evaluated as correct by the transmission code decoder), the safety code decoder re-
sponds by causing a permanent interruption of message transmission and provides
such data to SRE2 logics, that SRE2 passes into a safe state – a state which does not
threaten safety of the controlled process. However, this solution significantly affects
the availability of SRCS, even while having a very positive effect on its safety in-
tegrity, therefore several compromise solutions are opted out practically. Typically,
the following measures are applied at the safety code decoder level (individually or
in combination):
• checking of number of messages marked by the safety code decoder as corrupted
and if the tolerable number of corrupted messages in a defined time unit is
exceeded, a safe reaction is concluded;
• use of a ratio counter.
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A ratio counter counts within a defined range from the initialisation value IV to
the maximal value MV. During SRComS start the current value AV of ratio counter
is set on the IV initialisation value. The current value of the counter is changing in
dependence on the verification of the message received by the safety code decoder.
In case the received message is marked as correct, the value of AV is decremented
by the value PV (the IV value is a threshold value of decrementation). In case
the received message is marked as corrupted, the value of AV is incremented by
the value NV (while NV > PV ). After reaching or exceeding the value MV, a safe
reaction is concluded. An analysis of the ratio counter operation and the evaluation
of its effect on SRComS safety integrity is presented in [30].
5.1 Modification of the SRComS Model
The base model (Figure 3) can be modified (simplified) in dependence on how sig-
nificantly the individual risk factors influence the safety of messages transmission in
a case of a concrete SRComS. For example, we can suppose that the cryptographic
code has no effect on the identification of a message corrupted by hardware failure or
by EMI (pUE = 1). Accordingly, we can suppose that all message blocks incoming to
the receiver are corrupted (the cause of corruption is not differentiated – corruption
caused by EMI or corruption caused by transmitter failure, i.e. fB W = fB, where
fB W is frequency of corrupted blocks on receiver input without corruption cause
specified and fB is frequency of blocks generated by the transmitter). A model
modified according to these assumptions is shown in Figure 4. In this case, SR-
ComS is in state 15 16 if the message block corruption has not been detected and
the message block has been evaluated as correct by the receiver. In case all blocks
on the input of transmission system receiver are corrupted, the message will be eval-
uated as correct (non-corrupted) when all corrupt message blocks will be evaluated
as correct (non-corrupted) by the SRComS. Seeing that for the message corruption
detection holds, that if a corruption of leastwise a single message block is detected,
then message corruption is detected. Then
MFR ≤ BFR. k
m
, (13)
where MFR is message failure rate, BFR is block failure rate, k is number of bits
in a block and m is number of message bits.
Safety analysis can also be approached in an even more pessimistic way (what
is reasonable in case of high demands on safety integrity level of the transmitted
messages) by not considering safety properties of an untrusted transmission chain (as
if it would not have positive, but negative effect on the transmission safety integrity)
and only detection properties of safety code and potential random failures of safety
and cryptographic decoder are taken into account. In other words – it is supposed
that all messages incoming on the safety code decoder input are corrupted. Such
a very pessimistic approach is positive to the intent that at the change of untrusted
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Figure 4. Modified SRComS model providing pUE = 1 and fB W = fB
transmission system (a COTS system) or its components, there is no need to prove
the safety properties of a trusted transmission system again.
6 OBTAINED RESULTS
Let us consider a SRComS according to Figure 2, for which the following technical
and operational data is characteristic:
• rate of random hardware failures of transmission system components (transmit-
ter, communication channel and receiver component) RTS = 5.3.10
−5h−1
• rate of random hardware failures of transmission code decoder
RDT = 2.5.10
−6h−1
• rate of random hardware failures of safety code decoder RDS = 1.0.10−8h−1
• rate of random hardware failures of cryptographic code decoder
RDE = 1.0.10
−8h−1
• probability of error undetected by transmission code pUT = 2−16
• probability of error undetected by safety code pUS = 2−32
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• frequency of messages generated by the transmitter f = 72 000h−1
• short message length m = 256 kB, or a long message length m = 256 kB
• number of bits in a message block k = 64 b, or k = 128 b.
Let us assume, that all blocks on receiver input are corrupted. Then




Figures 5 to 8 show graphs of probability of undetected corrupted message
block pB H , message failure rate MFR and block failure rate BFR in a message
in SRComS for the created Markov model shown in Figure 4 and the considered
technical and operational data of SRComS stated at the beginning of Section 5.2.
The time dependencies pB H , BFR and MFR shown in Figures 5 to 7 are calcu-
lated for short message format of SR message m = 2 kB and cryptographic code
blocks size k = 64 bits. For comparison, Figures 8 to 10 show the time course








Figure 5. Time dependence of probability of the undetected corrupted message block for
a short message format and cryptographic code block size k = 64 b
The same way using the Markov model (Figure 4) we could generate graphical
dependencies pB H , BFR and MFR for the long message format in dependence on
block size k.
If we take a look at the results of message failure rate MFR within the SR-
ComS lifecycle and compare them for example for the time t = 10 000 hours
(which corresponds to SRComS operation of over 17 years), the message failure rate
MFR is of order 10−8, which satisfies the recommended values presented in [10],











Figure 6. Time dependence of block failure rate for a short message format and crypto-
graphic code block size k = 64 b









Figure 7. Time dependence of message failure rate for a short message format and cryp-
tographic code block size k = 64 b
thereby corresponding to safety integrity level SIL3. The comparison of results
presented in Figures 7 and 10 shows, that the results of rate of undetected cor-
rupted messages of SRComS for a chosen block size k for the EC and ED pair
are only slightly different and satisfy even the most pessimistic estimation we con-
sidered for the safety analysis of SRComS (according to Figure 2), the required
safety integrity level SIL3, which is a sufficient tolerable intensity of hazardous
failures for a SR industrial communication system with open transmission sys-
tem.







Figure 8. Time dependence of block failure rate for a short message format and crypto-
graphic code block size k = 128 b
Using the realised model in Figure 4, the results of safety analysis of a SRComS
could be easily generated for a different SRComS with different technical parameters









Figure 9. Time dependence of block failure rate for a short message format and crypto-
graphic code block size k = 128 b











Figure 10. Time dependence of message failure rate for a short message format and cryp-
tographic code block size k = 128 b
7 CONCLUSION
During safety analysis of SRComS the authors focused on the calculation of the
most important safety attributes of SRComS – failure rate or probability of haz-
ardous failures of SRComS, while building on the SIL3 safety integrity level, where
quantitative proof is practically required for the development of industrial safety-
related communication systems. The authors aimed at safety analysis of SRComS
with open transmission system which is being increasingly used in industrial ap-
plications and not only in COTS applications, but also in the applications with
elevated safety integrity level. Providing the use of open transmission system, it is
necessary to suppose an intentional attack on the system, i.e. the transmitted SR
messages have to be protected not only by the means of safety codes eliminating the
effect of communication channel interference, but also by the means of cryptographic
mechanisms. The contribution solves safety analysis of a combined SRComS (Fig-
ure 2) with safety and cryptography code, while assuming the cryptographic code
providing confidentiality of the transmitted SR messages. According to the require-
ments based on standards for cryptographic code, in the Markov model as well as in
the mathematical formulation of cryptographic code error probability (rate of non-
detection of message by the SRComS), the authors focused on a cryptographic code
belonging to the set of block symmetric cryptographic systems, while the block size k
has been chosen in line with computationally secure standards from the block cipher
set (k = 64 b – 3-DES algorithm, or k = 128 b – AES algorithm). Mathematical
calculations of a message (or block) non-detection are derived with the assumption
of a binary symmetric channel (BSC).
With respect to the fact that the occurrence of corrupted messages can be in
great measure considered to be a Markov process, the authors of the paper decided to
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make use of a CTMC-based model to model the safety attributes of SRComS (prob-
ability of non-detection of corrupted message, rate of non-detection of corrupted
message).
In order to create a model respecting the effect of the individual factors influenc-
ing the safety of SRComS with a specific evaluation of its transitions, it is necessary
to know the characteristics of SRComS and its behaviour in various operational sit-
uations. This means it is not possible to create a model which would be universally
applicable for different SRComS, however the fact is, that the foundations of the
model remain basically always the same.
Because the SRComS has to operate under all operational situations, in order
to guarantee the required SIL when modelling the monitored safety parameters, it is
necessary to consider the worst situations that can possibly occur during the opera-
tion. That means, that in case of SRComS we suppose, that all transmitted messages
are corrupted by either EMI, or because of hardware failure. It is also necessary to
consider the failure of the individual protection mechanisms dispatched within the
SRComS. In our case, it is an operational situation for which the calculated results
are shown in Figures 5 to 10. The practical calculations were realised for a specific
SRComS utilised within industrial applications with Wi-Fi transmission and they
confirmed, that the SRComS under consideration satisfies the SIL3 requirements ac-
cording to [10]. To solve the system of differential equations, Wolfram Mathematica
software tool has been used.
The presented model and the results obtained do not respect the fact that other
protection mechanisms exist (time-stamp, . . . ), which also significantly decreases
the probability of an improper message interpretation by the application part of the
receiver.
The verification of the model for evaluation of safety properties of a SRComS
is greatly problematic, cannot be assessed and cannot be performed by a practical
verification (very small values of probability of undetected corrupted messages). The
verification can only be performed based on statements of experts engaged in the
problem or by comparing the results obtained using different models.
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[23] Franeková, M.: Mathematical Apparatus for Safety Evaluation of Cryptography
and Safety Codes Used in Safety-Related Communication System. Modern Transport
Telematics: 11th International Conference on Transport Systems Telematics (TST
2011), Katowice-Ustrón, Poland, October 2011. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg,
Communications in Computer and Information Science, Vol. 239, 2011, pp. 126–135.
ISBN 978-3-642-24659-3.
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[25] Harlenderová, M.: Solution of Safety Analysis of Detection Possibilities of Safety
Codes within Binary Symmetric Channel. Dissertation work. ČVUT Prague, 2011 (in
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Communications, Žilina, Slovakia in 1982. He defended his
Ph.D. in the field of safety analysis in 1995. Since 2008 he has
been working as Professor in the Department of Control and
Information Systems at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering,
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